



# SPYWOLF

## Security Audit Report



Audit prepared for  
**SCORCH**

Completed on  
**June 20, 2025**



# OVERVIEW

This goal of this report is to review the main aspects of the project to help investors make an informative decision during their research process.

You will find a a summarized review of the following key points:


- ✓ Contract's source code
- ✓ Owners' wallets
- ✓ Tokenomics
- ✓ Team transparency and goals
- ✓ Website's age, code, security and UX
- ✓ Whitepaper and roadmap
- ✓ Social media & online presence

“

*The results of this audit are purely based on the team's evaluation and does not guarantee nor reflect the projects outcome and goal*

- SPYWOLF Team -

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

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|                        |    |
|------------------------|----|
| Project Description    | 01 |
| Contract Information   | 02 |
| Current Stats          | 03 |
| Vulnerability Check    | 04 |
| Errors Found           | 05 |
| Manual Code Review     | 06 |
| Found Threats          | 07 |
| Summary and Conclusion | 08 |
| Tokenomics             | 09 |
| About SPYWOLF          | 10 |
| Disclaimer             | 11 |



# SCORCH



## PROJECT DESCRIPTION

**SCORCH** is built on Shibarium Layer-2. Its main launch feature is the conversion (or "burning") of SHIB in exchange for SCORCH tokens. This mechanism permanently removes SHIB from circulation.

As the project expands, it becomes a "burn platform" that any project owner or token holder can use to facilitate community-driven token burns.

**Release Date:** TBD

**Category:** Token

01



# CONTRACT INFO

Token Name  
SCORCH

Symbol  
SCORCH

Contract Address  
Testnet

Network  
Shibarium

Language  
Solidity

Deployment Date  
Not Deployed Yet

Contract Type  
Staking

Total Supply  
15,000,000,000

Status  
Not Deployed Yet

## TAXES

Buy Tax  
**1%**

Sell Tax  
**1%**

## Our Contract Review Process

The contract review process pays special attention to the following:

- ✓ Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon vulnerabilities
- ✓ Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- ✓ Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- ✓ Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- ✓ Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

### Blockchain security tools used:

- OpenZeppelin
- Mythril
- Solidity Compiler
- Hardhat



## TOKEN TRANSFERS STATS

|                         |                  |
|-------------------------|------------------|
| Transfer Count          | Not Deployed Yet |
| Uniq Senders            | Not Deployed Yet |
| Uniq Receivers          | Not Deployed Yet |
| Total Amount            | Not Deployed Yet |
| Median Transfer Amount  | Not Deployed Yet |
| Average Transfer Amount | Not Deployed Yet |
| First transfer date     | Not Deployed Yet |
| Last transfer date      | Not Deployed Yet |
| Days token transferred  | Not Deployed Yet |

## SMART CONTRACT STATS

|                       |                  |
|-----------------------|------------------|
| Calls Count           | Not Deployed Yet |
| External calls        | Not Deployed Yet |
| Internal calls        | Not Deployed Yet |
| Transactions count    | Not Deployed Yet |
| Uniq Callers          | Not Deployed Yet |
| Days contract called  | Not Deployed Yet |
| Last transaction time | Not Deployed Yet |
| Created               | Not Deployed Yet |
| Create TX             | Not Deployed Yet |
| Creator               | Not Deployed Yet |



# VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

| ID      | Title                                |        |
|---------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| SWC-100 | Function Default Visibility          | Passed |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow       | Passed |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version            | Passed |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma                      | Passed |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value          | Passed |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal         | Passed |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | Passed |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy                           | Passed |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility    | Passed |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer        | Passed |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation                     | Passed |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | Passed |
| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee     | Passed |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call                 | Passed |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence         | Passed |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin      | Passed |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time     | Passed |
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability               | Passed |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name           | Passed |



# VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

| ID      | Title                                                   |        |
|---------|---------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables                               | Passed |
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes        | Passed |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks     | Passed |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification                   | Passed |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation                                   | Passed |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location                     | Passed |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order                             | Passed |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Griefing                               | Passed |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable              | Passed |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit                                | Passed |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error                                     | Passed |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)       | Passed |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables                            | Passed |
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance                                | Passed |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | Passed |
| SWC-134 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount                  | Passed |
| SWC-135 | Code With No Effects                                    | Passed |
| SWC-136 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain                       | Passed |



# VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

## NO ERRORS FOUND



# MANUAL CODE REVIEW

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When performing smart contract audits, our specialists look for known vulnerabilities as well as logical and access control issues within the code. The exploitation of these issues by malicious actors may cause serious financial damage to projects that failed to get an audit in time.

We categorize these vulnerabilities by 4 different threat levels.

## THREAT LEVELS

### High Risk

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Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

### Medium Risk

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Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance, functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

### Low Risk

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Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.

### Informational

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Information level is to offer suggestions for improvement of efficacy or security for features with a risk free factor.



# FOUND THREATS

## Low Risk

### No Tax Applied on Very Small Transfer Amounts

The burn tax is calculated using integer division: `taxAmount = value.mul(BURN_TAX_NUMERATOR).div(BURN_TAX_DENOMINATOR);`. If the `value` of a transfer is less than `BURN_TAX_DENOMINATOR` (which is 100), the `taxAmount` will round down to zero.

**Impact:** Transfers of amounts less than 100 wei (the smallest unit of the token) will not incur any burn tax. While the economic impact of untaxed dust amounts is likely negligible, this means the 1% tax isn't universally applied to every single non-zero value transfer.

- Recommendation:
  - This behavior is typical for integer division in Solidity. It should be documented and understood. Attempting to tax these minute amounts could cost more in gas than the tax itself. The current implementation is generally acceptable.



# FOUND THREATS

## ~~Low Risk~~

 Fixed

### Increased Gas Cost for Token Transfers

The overridden `_update` function, which implements the 1% burn tax, involves several operations beyond a standard ERC20 transfer: an additional `balanceOf` read (within the `require` statement for the total amount), arithmetic operations for tax calculation, a `_burn` operation (which includes an `SSTORE` and an event), and the emission of an additional `TokensBurnedWithTax` event.

**Impact:** This results in higher gas consumption for every token transfer compared to ERC20 tokens without on-transfer tax logic. While a known trade-off for this type of feature, it can negatively affect user experience and transaction affordability, especially during periods of high network congestion or on chains with higher gas fees.

- Recommendation:
  - This is an inherent cost of the feature. Ensure users are aware of the potentially higher gas fees. No direct code change is advised if the feature is intended to operate as is, but benchmarking gas costs would be prudent.



# FOUND THREATS

## ~~Low Risk~~

 Fixed

### Absence of a Pause Mechanism for Emergency Situations

The contract does not inherit or implement any pausing functionality (e.g., OpenZeppelin's [Pausable](#) utility). A pause mechanism allows designated addresses to temporarily halt most or all contract functions in case a critical vulnerability or an unexpected issue is discovered post-deployment.

**Impact:** If a severe bug unrelated to admin controls (e.g., a flaw in the ERC20 interaction, or an issue with the tax mechanism that allows unforeseen exploits) is found, there is no way to stop contract activity to prevent further damage or exploitation without redeploying the entire contract.

- Recommendation:
  - Consider incorporating a pausable mechanism. If added, the control over pausing/unpausing would typically reside with a highly secured address or governance protocol. (While pausing introduces a control element, the lack of it is a risk to the contract's stability itself).



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

### Contract is Not Upgradeable

The smart contract is not implemented using an upgradeability pattern (e.g., proxy patterns like UUPS or Transparent Upgradeable Proxy). This means its logic is immutable once deployed.

### Fixed Maximum Supply

The SCORCH token has a hardcoded `MAX_SUPPLY` of `15,000,000,000 * (10 ** 18)`, which cannot be altered. The `mint` function respects this cap.

### Burn-on-Transfer Feature

A 1% tax is applied to token transfers (excluding minting operations or direct burns to `address(0)`). This tax amount is deducted from the sender and burned, reducing the total supply over time.



# FOUND THREATS

## Informational

### Utilization of OpenZeppelin Standards

The contract leverages established OpenZeppelin libraries for core ERC20 functionality ([ERC20.sol](#)), context provision ([Context.sol](#)), reentrancy protection ([ReentrancyGuard.sol](#)), and role-based access ([AccessControl.sol](#)). This is a good practice as these libraries are well-audited and battle-tested.

### Comprehensive Event Emissions

The contract correctly emits events for significant actions: [TokensBurnedWithTax](#) for taxed burns, standard [Transfer](#) events for minting, regular transfers, and direct burns. [AccessControl](#) (used for [MINTER\\_ROLE](#)) also emits role-related events. These are essential for off-chain applications, UIs, and transaction tracking.



# SUMMARY & CONCLUSION

The **SCORCH** token smart contract exhibits a commendable adherence to established blockchain development practices, notably through its proficient use of OpenZeppelin's industry-standard libraries. This approach significantly strengthens the contract's security posture against many common vulnerabilities.

Following an initial review, the team has proactively enhanced the contract's robustness by integrating an emergency **pause mechanism**, providing critical protection for users, and by **removing external libraries** in favor of relying on the native security features of the modern Solidity compiler.

The core tokenomics, including a fixed maximum supply and the innovative 1% burn tax mechanism, remain implemented with clarity. The logic for applying the tax is transparent, and essential events are diligently emitted to foster on-chain transparency. The project's design choices, such as the gas implications of the on-transfer tax or the current approach to contract upgradeability, represent strategic decisions with inherent trade-offs.


In essence, the SCORCH token contract showcases a well-structured and secure design, further improved by the team's commitment to best practices. As with any smart contract deployment, a final review of the updated code is an indispensable step to ensure the utmost security and readiness for launch.



\*The following tokenomics are based on the project's whitepaper and/or website:

## Tokens distribution

- Team & Founders (3.33%)
- Advisors & Partnerships (1.67%)
- Ecosystem Development (11.67%)
- Pre-Sale (13.33% = 2 billion tokens)
- Liquidity Pool (10%)
- Community Rewards/Airdrops (10%)
- Staking Pools (20%)
- Expansion Plans (5%)
- Burning Platform Reserve (28.33%)



TOKENOMICS



# SPYWOLF

## CRYPTO SECURITY

Audits | KYCs | dApps  
Contract Development

# ABOUT US

We are a growing crypto security agency offering audits, KYCs and consulting services for some of the top names in the crypto industry.

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# Disclaimer

This report shows findings based on our limited project analysis, following good industry practice from the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, overall social media and website presence and team transparency details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report.

While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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No applications were reviewed for security. No product code has been reviewed.